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The role of emotions in relational work 
 
Andreas Langlotz, Miriam A. Locher 
 
Abstract 
While the role of emotions for communication has been recognized as important in 
numerous research disciplines, insights have rarely been exploited for linguistic research, 
nor have they been incorporated systematically in the traditional theories on relational 
work. This paper offers a literature review on emotion research for linguists and then 
focuses in particular on the creation of relational meaning within interpersonal 
pragmatics. Since emotional display is often signalled in gestures or facial expressions in 
addition to or in complement to linguistic evidence, we propose taking a multi-modal 
approach to the study of relationship construction. For this purpose we combine Clark’s 
(1996) work on the creation of meaning with a multi-modal tool-kit for analysis. The paper 
ends with an assessment on how this inclusion of emotional cues in our analysis of 
relational work improves our understanding of interpersonal pragmatics.  
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper explores the emotional display of a linguistic and multi-modal nature within 
the framework of interpersonal pragmatics. In recent years, traditional politeness research 
has opened up its focus to concentrate more generally on the relational and interpersonal 
aspect of communication, including face-aggravating, face-maintaining and face-enhancing 
behaviour (see Locher, 2013 for an overview). The discursive approach to the study of 
politeness, by no means a unified approach (see Locher, 2012; LPRG Group, 2011), 
highlights that there is a difference between emic and etic judgments on what is deemed 
polite, impolite, uncouth, etc. One of the research gaps within this research tradition was 
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identified as the question of how judgements by interactants come about. Next to stating 
that judgments on whether a particular utterance was deemed polite or impolite, etc. 
depend on situated assessments of the exploitation of norms in situ, it was pointed out 
that these assessments crucially also have an emotional component (Locher and Langlotz, 
2008; Culpeper, 2011; Spencer-Oatey, 2011) in that interactors react with emotions to the 
violations or the adherence of personal expectations and social norms. This link is also 
addressed by Spencer-Oatey (2007:644) who claims that “[F]ace is associated with affective 
sensitivity” and that “face is a vulnerable phenomenon, and hence associated with 
emotional reactions.” However, she also concedes that emotions have rather been “[a]n 
implicit thread running through nearly all this ‘relational’ research” and, following Culpeper 
(2011) and Ruhi (2009), she therefore states that “there has been surprisingly little research 
on this aspect, at least until recently” (Spencer-Oatey, 2011:3568). This raises the question 
of how emotions can be included into the theoretical and methodological picture of 
interpersonal pragmatics and of how their role in relational work can be theorized and 
explored. Since this aspect has not been systematically pursued yet within (im)politeness 
research, this paper takes this research gap as a starting point to review the existing 
literature on emotions in an endeavour to make the research insights usable for 
interpersonal pragmatics. 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we will first position our approach to 
relational work within the context of interpersonal pragmatics to set the stage for the 
subsequent theoretical considerations on the emotional impact on relational work. Having 
identified the emotional gap in this linguistic research strand, we will then provide an 
overview of previous research into language and emotion in linguistics as well as 
communication studies (sections 3–5). While emotions have not played a crucial role in 
the former, research on emotional communication is far more advanced in the latter. 
Although we cannot present an extensive literature review of either area, our aim is to 
discuss to what extent previous insights can be integrated into the framework of relational 
work and in how far our approach can be seen as making an independent contribution to 
the complex connections between language and emotion from a decidedly interpersonal 
pragmatic perspective. For this purpose the literature review will be organized around 
three central questions: 
- What are emotions? (section 3) 
- What are the links between emotions and interpersonal relationships? (section 4) 
- How are emotions signalled in interaction and how is the communication of 
emotions influenced by social and cultural norms? (section 5) 
In line with these questions, we aim to distill the relevant parameters for an analysis of 
emotions within the context of relational work from previous work. To exemplify our own 
approach to analysing emotion and relational work, we will employ one example of a brief 
interaction between two characters from the cartoon ‘Calvin and Hobbes’. This data is 
introduced in section 6 with a focus on the multi-modal emotional signals and their 
potential evaluative meanings that influence the dynamic construal of the relationship 
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between the protagonists. In section 7 we will then focus on the dynamic practice of 
signalling emotions and of how these multi-modal signals may lead to the construal of 
evaluative meanings that affect the given relationship. With reference to Clark’s (1996:Ch. 
6) model of communicative signalling, we will first focus on the methodological challenges 
of handling composite emotional signals and then discuss how the interactors employ 
these signals to coordinate integrated evaluations of social relationships. The ‘Calvin and 
Hobbes’ cartoon will thus serve to establish the link between our theoretical 
considerations and their implementation in data analysis. The paper concludes with 
providing some further suggestions for modelling emotional contributions in a discursive 
approach to relational meaning. 
 
2. Interpersonal pragmatics, relational work and the emotional lacuna in 
linguistic analysis 
To position our approach, we first need to define Interpersonal Pragmatics and 
Relational Work and point to key issues within this approach. The relational function of 
language use is of central interest to the domain of Interpersonal Pragmatics: 
The term ‘interpersonal pragmatics’ is used to designate examinations of interactions 
between people that both affect and are affected by their understandings of culture, 
society, and their own and others’ interpretations. (Locher and Graham, 2010:2) 
Interpersonal Pragmatics is not a new field per se nor is it a new theory, but it highlights 
the interpersonal/relational perspective on language in use. In line with this perspective, 
social meaning is created as interpersonal relationships are discursively constructed. In 
this process, the interactors perform and negotiate situated social images and roles. In 
doing so, relationships are created, maintained, and challenged through interaction. 
Interpersonal pragmatics thus casts particular light on relational work (Locher, 2004; 
Locher and Watts, 2005, 2008). 
Being embedded in the traditions of interpersonal pragmatics and (im)politeness1 
research, relational work positions itself as a discursive approach to the management of 
relational meaning, i.e. the meaning that we attribute to social relationships. 
Relational work refers to all aspects of the work invested by individuals in the construction, 
maintenance, reproduction and transformation of interpersonal relationships among those 
engaged in social practice. (Locher and Watts, 2008:96) 
Thus, the notion of relational work considers relationships as dynamic constructs that 
emerge through interaction in situated contexts and relative to norms. In order to mediate 
the discursive construction of relational meaning, interlocutors depend on processes of 
multi-modal signalling that are distributed over dynamic action-sequences (see Clark, 
1996). It is 
                                               
1 Please consult Locher (2008, 2012) for a discussion of how judgments of politeness, impoliteness, rudeness 
or any other first order judgement by interactants is linked to relational work and identity construction. 
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these complex and interdependent processes of signalling and signal interpretation that 
characterize the ‘work’ invested by the interactional partners. Crucially, however, 
relational work is not only guided by the interactors’ personal ‘work’ decisions. 
Interactions are embedded in socio-normative contexts that influence the ways in which 
the communicators choose their ways of signalling and how they interpret them. 
It is further necessary to highlight the socio-cognitive dimensions of relational work. 
Both interactants must draw on their knowledge and sense-making skills to interpret their 
communicative actions. They do this by activating frames for interactional conventions, 
roles, and procedures (Tannen, 1993:53). They signal, construct, interpret, and assign 
activity-specific goals and intentions (see, e.g. Tomasello et al., 2005); and they engage in 
situated processes of conceptualization, i.e. cognitive processes of inferring meaning in 
situ (Langlotz, 2010). It is important to emphasize that these sense-making processes are 
not cognitively isolated nor socially encapsulated in the individual. Rather, through the 
interaction, the interlocutors’ cognitive work becomes interdependent. Note that this 
does not imply that the individual mind does not constitute the medium for cognitive 
processes (see Spencer-Oatey’s criticism in this volume). However, the discursive acts of 
one partner are adapted and designed to influence and ‘manipulate’ the mental states of 
the other. As a consequence, the scope of the partners’ cognitive processing in terms of 
setting goals, planning discourse moves, and taking communicative decisions is social, 
rather than personal (see Arundale, 2010). 
As mentioned above, the study of relational work and linguistics in general has hardly 
integrated the systematic analysis of its emotional component into its research scope. 
While the existence of emotive language or affective meaning had already been 
recognized by Aristotle (McKeon, 1941) and emotions play a central role in human 
psychology and sociality, the contribution of emotional framing for sense-making 
processes has not been extensively theorized nor thoroughly researched in linguistics 
apart from a number of explorations into this field. In structuralism and generativism 
emotions played a highly marginal if not inexistent role (Jay and Janschewitz, 2007). For 
example, while the idea of word connotation in structural semantics points to the 
existence of the emotional associations that people have for lexemes, the theory of langue 
clearly put its emphasis on the denotation of words and thus imposed a theoretical and 
terminological boundary between linguistic and emotional analysis (Schwarz-Friesel, 
2007:162--173). In generativism such epistemological boundaries were drawn on a more 
cognitive level: Defending a highly modular view of cognitive and linguistic competence, 
generativism clearly separated linguistic knowledge from all other psychological 
phenomena. As a consequence, emotional aspects do not have a place in the generative 
view of language. 
Emotional dimensions of language have been more openly addressed in the functional 
traditions of linguistic analysis. Back in 1934, Bühler included an expressive function into 
his organon model of language-based communication. The same is true for Jakobson’s 
(1960) model of the six language functions, which attributes an emotive function of 
expression to the speaker. While being fairly restricted to the analysis of individual 
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utterances, these early functionalist frameworks have certainly paved the way for a more 
integrative and comprehensive view of language and linguistic meaning. This, for instance, 
is evidenced by the fact that Halliday (1975) makes a tripartite distinction between 
ideational, interpersonal, and textual functions of linguistic units in the context of his 
systemic-functional grammar. Interestingly, however, emotional components still seem to 
play a minor role in this functional classification as part of the interpersonal function. 
More integrative approaches to the relationship between language and emotion have 
been offered in anthropological linguistics and linguistic ethnography (see Wilce, 2009 for 
an overview), conversation and discourse analysis (see Pepin, 2008 for an overview), and 
cognitive linguistics (for overviews see Niemeier and Dirven, 1997; Foolen et al., 2012).2 
Extensive research on emotional communication has been offered in communication 
studies. In what follows, we will engage with these insights from previous research to 
discuss to what extent they are conducive to the analysis of relational work. The aim of 
the literature review is to distill essential parameters for a theoretical and methodological 
framework that allows us to incorporate the analysis of emotions in relational work. We 
will start by discussing the fundamental role of emotions in general and ask how emotions 
can become an object of analysis for linguistics in general and interpersonal pragmatics in 
particular. 
 
3. What are emotions? 
Although emotions are empirically real phenomena that we experience on an everyday 
basis, they have so far escaped the grasp of science. Adopting a highly sceptical 
philosophical perspective, Griffiths (1997:247) goes as far as to deny emotions the status 
of natural categories altogether: “The research surveyed in this book suggests that the 
general concept of emotion has no role in any future psychology.” Instead he claims that 
what we perceive as emotional states and what we denote by the word emotion may 
involve a heterogeneous cluster of inner psychic states. 
Taking the intricate nature and the diverse functions of emotions into account, 
Schwarz-Friesel (2007) defines them as follows: 
Emotions are multi-dimensional, internally represented and subjectively experienced 
syndrome categories; they can be self-perceived by an individual on the introspective planes 
of the mind as well as the body; their experiential values are associated with a positive or 
negative judgement; and they can be expressed to others in the form of perceptible display 
variants. The judgmental processes concern evaluations through which an individual 
appraises his/her own bodily sensations, psychological state, behavioural impulses, 
cognitive representations or general environmental states (in the broadest sense). 
(Schwarz-Friesel, 2007:55, our translation) 
90 
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emotion such as the Languages of Emotion Cluster of Excellence at the Freie Universität Berlin 
(http://www.languages-of-emotion.de/). 
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Thus, Schwarz-Friesel describes emotions as syndrome categories that comprise different 
facets: internal mental and body states, perceptible display variants, and judgmental 
processes that lead to subjective evaluations of the inner and outer world of experience. 
In psychology, the complex nature of emotions and the difficulty of delimiting them as 
psychological entities has led to process models that regard them as a dynamic assembly 
of multiple components. According to Planalp (1999:11) a process theory of emotion 
involves the following dimensions: “(1) objects, causes, precipitating events, (2) appraisal, 
(3) physiological changes, (4) action tendencies/action/expression, (5) regulation” 
(emphasis in original). For instance, a basic emotion such as fear may be caused by an 
exam situation (1), which is appraised as being too difficult (2), and thus leads to 
physiological changes such as an increased heart rate, nervousness, sweating, etc. (3). This 
might lead to certain action tendencies such as stuttering, bodily agitation, or a shaky 
handwriting, and may be expressed to the examiner by showing a concerned face, by 
lowering the voice, or by directly addressing one’s state verbally: “I’m feeling so nervous” 
(4). The state of fear can also be regulated by the examinee’s trying to be brave or by the 
examiner’s attempts at relaxing the student (5). While different approaches to emotion 
may highlight one of the components from this emotional process more than others, we 
can assume that emotions function as internally represented value-categories that can be 
perceived subjectively and expressed to interactors. Hence, emotions must not be seen 
as primitive and irrational psychic states, but as a complex, embodied value system 
(Damasio, 1994, 1999, 2003). 
Along these general lines emotions fulfil evaluative functions that help us define our 
relationship to and our understanding of the world of experience (cf. Schwarz-Friesel, 
2007:67). Emotions influence our reactions to and our actions upon our physical and social 
environments. They may be directed towards other people, objects, states, events, etc. 
and thus help us define our relationship to them. And self-referential emotions such as 
shame, regret or pride define the relationships to our selves. Very strong emotional states 
like panic, fear, lust may cause overwhelming bodily symptoms that determine our 
orientation towards and further engagement with our world of experience. On the basis 
of these dimensions, Table 1 proposes a grid for the description and categorization of 
emotions (see Schwarz-Friesel, 2007). For instance, panic can be described as a form of 
the basic emotion type fear that is caused by situational factors and causes very strong 
bodily symptoms. It is associated with a negative evaluation and is very intensive but 
momentary and occasional rather than permanent. By contrast, sorrow is an intensive and 
permanent negative emotion that is a form of sadness and is self-referential although it is 
triggered by the loss of a close friend or relative. 
Different instantiations of the central components of the emotional process lead to 
different emotion types (Damasio, 1994:Ch. 7). Primary emotions (anger, fear, happiness, 
etc.) are seen as continuing the biological legacy of life preservation that we share with 
other animals (Darwin, 1872). They are triggered by external stimuli and, through innate 
dispositional representations, evoke a body state (increased heart rate, blood pressure, 
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etc.) that corresponds to the primary emotion. The search for basic, primary emotions is 
reflected in various psychological studies (Ekman, 2003; Plutchik, 2003). Most 
prominently, the psychologist Ekman (1973, 2003) distinguishes the following basic and 
universal types of emotions (and their corresponding facial expressions, see section 5): 
Anger, fear, disgust, surprise, happiness, sadness. However, the search for a universal set 
of basic and innate primary human emotions has not led to conclusive results and has 
remained fairly controversial as emotions and their expression seem to be subject to 
strong cultural differences (for an overview see Planalp, 1999:Ch. 7). Most importantly, 
beyond the potential set of basic emotion types, 
Table 1 
Classificatory grid for emotion categories, based on Schwarz-Friesel (2007:Ch. 3.3). 
Emotion 
A. Type and function:  Emotion categories 
B. Quality: Positive vs. negative evaluation 
C. Intensity: Strong - weak continuum 
D. Duration: Permanent vs. temporary 
 
there are a great many emotional subtypes, some of which are highly culture-specific. The 
strong influence of social and cultural learning on emotion management is captured by the 
term secondary emotion (Damasio, 1994:134–139). Unlike primary emotions, secondary 
emotions (embarrassment, guilt, pride, etc.) are learned through experience and 
socialization (Turner and Stets, 2005:15–19; see also Culpeper, 2011:59). 
The socially constructed and culture-specific nature of emotions has been most 
prominently discussed by researchers interested in the cultural relativity of human 
concepts, behaviours, practices, and languages. As sketched above, Western psychologists 
and neuropsychologist have assumed emotions to have strong biological foundations. 
They have therefore promoted a highly universalist view of human emotionality. By 
contrast, anthropological linguists have highlighted the strong cultural relativity of 
emotion concepts, emotion words, and emotional practices of expression and 
communication (see, e.g. Goddard, 2002; Wierzbicka, 1994). Along similar lines and 
promoting a social constructionist approach to emotion, Harré claims that: 
[…], the overlay of cultural and linguistic factors on biology is so great that the physiological 
aspect of some emotional states has had to be relegated to secondary status, as one among 
the effects of the more basic sociocultural phenomena. (Harré, 1986a,b:4) 
Highlighting the socially constructed nature of emotions over their presumed biological 
underpinnings, social constructionists see emotions as socially and culturally shaped and 
malleable products that are strongly influenced by language-specific emotion words and 
emotional practices. Thus, emotion words do not seem to denote clear-cut psychological 
entities but themselves construct conceptual units for emotional events (Wilce, 2009:80). 
This turns emotions into more social and interpersonal phenomena that are embedded 
within the moral order of a given society or culture. For instance, the medieval emotion 
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termed accidie – a feeling of tiredness and unwillingness to commit to one’s religious 
duties – can only be understood within the social and historical context of religious 
practices in the middle ages and the corresponding moral order of Christianity (Harré and 
Finlay-Jones, 1986). Similarly, the Japanese emotion amae – a feeling of baby-like 
coquettish love towards and sweet dependence on the superior – seems natural in a 
Japanese cultural context but childish if performed by adults in the West (Morsbach and 
Tyler, 1986). From the perspective of relational work, these insights are particularly 
interesting as they show that emotions are not only recruited or referred to in social 
interaction, but that social interaction and the social and moral backgrounds in which it 
takes place itself shapes emotional interpretations in agreement with the social roles that 
are performed by the interactors. 
While emotions are difficult to conceptualize, these complex syndrome categories 
must be claimed to function as important components of meaning. Since emotions serve 
the primary purpose of evaluating our inner and outer worlds of experience, we would like 
to define this emotional dimension of meaning as evaluative meaning. From a linguistic 
and discourse analytical perspective, however, it is important to emphasize that emotions 
are not empirically accessible on the basis of the methodological apparatuses available. 
Only external stimuli for emotional states and the expressive responses to those stimuli 
can be observed. For a linguistic analysis of emotions in the context of interpersonal 
pragmatics and relational work this entails that we cannot really refer to this fuzzy inner 
world of emotional reference, but that we can only analyze the range of multi-modal 
signals that are used by interactors to index potential emotional states (see also Wilce, 
2009:10). For the analysis of relational work this means that emotions can only be 
analyzed as externalized and communicative phenomena rather than internal 
psychological states as we do not have empirical access to the latter. However, it is 
possible to engage with the presence of emotional cues or their striking absence when 
they would actually be expected according to the norms of the interaction in question and 
ask what these cues communicate as part of the relational work performed by the 
interactional partners. On the basis of these emotional signals, we must then infer the 
evaluative meaning that they might entail. Epistemologically speaking, the analysis of 
evaluative meaning through discourse analytical methods thus faces the very same 
problems of interpretation as any other inferential model of meaning generation. This 
intricate relationship between emotional signals and evaluative meanings will be further 
discussed in section 5. In what follows, we will first turn to the connections between 
emotions and interpersonal relationships. 
 
4. What are the links between emotions and interpersonal relationships? 
Human sociality cannot be understood without the positive and negative associations 
that we have with different social relationships. Interestingly, the connection between 
emotions and interpersonal relationships is highly reciprocal: emotions are decisive for the 
construal of the relationship and social relationships are the most important source for 
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human emotions. In the psychological literature this link between emotional 
communication and sociality is best exemplified by the success of Goleman’s book 
Emotional Intelligence (1995), which made it onto the bestseller lists with the title turning 
into a buzz word, especially in the corporate sector. While one may object to such a 
colloquialization and objectification of the yet underexplored connections between 
emotion and human intelligence, Goleman’s book provides further evidence that 
emotional dimensions cannot be excluded from research on language use and the study 
of relational 
work. In this section, we would therefore like to engage with the principles of emotion in 
social interaction as sketched in the area of communication studies. These principles 
constitute important theoretical guidelines for integrating emotional parameters into 
interpersonal pragmatics and relational work. Note that communication studies have also 
investigated the role of emotional communication in diverse communicative practices 
such as conflicts, family conversation, marriage counselling, etc. While these specific usage 
contexts are highly relevant with regard to relational work, we do not have the space to 
review them here (for an overview see Andersen and Guerrero, 1998a). 
Andersen and Guerrero (1998b) discuss six principles that determine the links between 
emotional communication and the interactional management of interpersonal 
relationships: 
1. “Socially adaptive emotional communication is positively selected in the 
evolutionary process.” (50)  
2. “Socialization processes guide how individuals manage their communication of 
emotion” (52)  
3. “Interpersonal schemata [scripts of ‘normal behaviour’], including goals, needs, 
desires, and expectations affect how and when emotion is experienced and 
communicated.” (64) 
4. “Interpersonal communication3 is the primary elicitor of most emotions.” (57)  
5. “An essential feature of the emotional experience is expression via interpersonal 
communication.” (73) 
6. “Emotions generate other emotions in interaction chains.” (82) 
In our interpretation, the first three principles can be read as foundational principles that 
determine the basic biological, socio-cultural, and cognitive connections between emotion 
and social interaction. The last three principles are focused on the actual role that 
emotions play in interpersonal communication and vice versa. 
The first principle addresses the central function of emotions for human bonding and 
the management of interpersonal relationships. Human sociality is fundamentally 
grounded in our ability to empathize and emote with others. This is supported by both 
ontogenetic and phylogenetic studies on human social skills (Bråten, 2007; Malloch and 
Trevarthen, 2009; Turner, 2000, 2007; Turner and Stets, 2005). Emotions guide and 
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3 Andersen and Guerrero (1998b) use the term “socially adaptive emotional communication” to refer to the 
evolutionary perspective of the phylogenesis of the human species, while “interpersonal communication” is 
synonymous to our concept of linguistic interaction. 
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influence the dynamic and interactive construal of relational meaning. On the one hand, 
humans seem to have an innate “need for frequent, affectively pleasant interactions with 
a few other people in the context of a temporally stable and enduring framework of 
affective concern for each other’s welfare” (Baumeister and Leary, 1995:497). This seems 
to start from the very beginning of human ontogeny because research in developmental 
psychology shows how distressed babies become when their caretakers are in their 
presence but do not produce any emotional signals for bonding with their babies (Tronick, 
2005). 
Beyond providing the fundamental glue for relating, emotions also play a decisive role 
for interactional practices of social sanctioning: “[O]ne of the basic functions of emotion 
is to regulate behaviour so as to form and maintain social bonds” (Baumeister and Leary, 
1995:497). Turner (2000, 2007) goes as far as to claim that development of a more subtle 
repertoire of emotions and emotional expressions in itself was the key for turning humans 
into the socially adaptive animals that we are expected to be these days (see also Planalp, 
1999:137). Most importantly, Turner argues that humans had to considerably increase 
their repertoire of positive emotions and corresponding displays in order to establish and 
maintain close social bonds. This is also in agreement with Jing-Schmidt’s (2007) cognitive-
linguistic analysis of the negativity bias (Rozin and Royzman, 2001), which can be described 
as a threat bias that is linked to dangerous situations and calls for quick emotional 
responses. In line with this bias, Jing-Schmidt (2007:419) argues that the evolutionary 
more basic emotional tendency to focus on negative (social) information is an evolutionary 
advantage as it is an “automatic vigilance strategy”. In contrast, the Polyanna effect (or 
positivity bias) refers to the general tendency to use evaluatively positive words more 
often than evaluatively negative ones. This means that humans try to overcome the 
negativity bias by trying to establish a positive orientation to their worlds of experience 
through symbolic practices (Jing-Schmidt, 2007:422). In the evolution of human sociality, 
the development of a repertoire of positive emotions as well as strategies for sanctioning 
and inhibiting the display of negative ones thus seems to play a key role for the central 
human ability to construct relationships through discursive practices. Therefore, a 
discursive-pragmatic model of interpersonal communication, which links human 
emotionality with interactional skills and practices, should also put the connection 
between relational work and its emotional component at the centre stage of a theory of 
human sociality and linguistic-communicative capacities. 
This evolutionary idea is also encapsulated in Andersen and Guerrero’s principle 2, 
which applies to the development of human individuals rather than the development of 
the human species. Human beings can only learn about appropriate social behaviour and 
the corresponding norms of emotional communication through complex and culture-
specific processes of socialization in which acts of parental guidance play very important 
roles. Through social referencing, emotional displays support socialization and 
enculturation processes (Nishdia and Lillard, 2007). Emotional displays play 
a decisive role in the socialization process as they provide the glue for social referencing. 
Parents work as models of emotional display regarding the norms and moral codes of their 
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cultural environments. In their various studies in the area of language socialization, Ochs 
and Schieffelin (1984, 1989) have also proposed that a child learns about the world of 
experience by paying attention to the linguistic expression of affect communicated by 
their parents (Ochs and Schieffelin, 1989:8). They revealed intricate and reciprocal 
connections between emotion, language learning and cultural learning (Ochs and 
Schieffelin, 1984; Ochs, 1986). Language socialization thus becomes “socialization both to 
and through the use of language” (Wilce, 2009:55). To account for the children’s ability of 
learning about the world through their parents’ emoting, these authors also developed a 
complex grid of emotional cues that may signal emotional orientations in and through 
language (see below). 
Principle 2 is fully compatible with the social constructionist view of emotions as 
discursive constructs rather than purely internalized psychological states. Moreover, it ties 
in nicely with our idea that relational work (and emotional practices of social sanctioning) 
can only emerge relative to the background of social contexts and their corresponding 
norms. We have argued that these norms are stored as cognitive frames in the interactors’ 
long-term memories. This cognitive dimension of relational work ties in with the third 
principle proposed by Andersen and Guerrero; interpersonal schemata as well as the 
interactors’ goals and expectations work as an important benchmark for evaluating the 
communicative behaviour of the partner. We will engage with this principle in more detail 
in section 5. 
The last three principles address the connections between emotions and actual 
practices of interpersonal communication and social bonding. The fourth principle is of 
central importance for our bringing together relational work and emotion. The very fact 
that people work on their social positions through relational work is the primary cause for 
emotional experience: “[…] the primary elicitor of emotions is interpersonal interaction. 
[…]. Moreover, people often strategically induce emotional states in others as a way of 
achieving interpersonal goals” (Andersen and Guerrero, 1998b:64). Along these lines, 
social relationships and social interactions are the most important source for human 
emotions (Andersen and Guerrero, 1998b). While we may also love, hate, or fear specific 
objects or creatures, we live in socially constructed worlds of experience and primarily 
evaluate and make sense of them through the human agents with whom we interact and 
who influence our emotional states (see also Harré, 1986a,b). 
In line with principle 5, interlocutors communicate their emotional orientations to the 
other for the strategic management of their relational goals (see also Frijda and Mesquita, 
1994). The emotional orientation of the interactional partners towards both the symbolic 
construction of (process), as well as the emergent construct of their relationship (product) 
is decisive for relational work. As a result, relational work is often accompanied by an 
emotional interaction in accord with the sixth principle proposed by Andersen and 
Guerrero. But to be able to communicate emotionality to the interactional partner as well 
as to literally ‘perceive’ emotional states in the other, human beings depend on complex 
semiotic tools of emotional signalling. Remember that these emotional signals just 
constitute one component of the complex emotional syndromes but in order to 
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understand how relational work is linked to emotions through complex practices of 
emotional signalling we will now scrutinize this semiotic dimension of emotions in the 
following section. 
 
5. How are emotions signalled interaction and how is the communication of 
emotions influenced by social and cultural norms? 
If we wish to understand the relational work performed by interactors, we centrally 
need to account for how they use emotional cues in order to express or communicate their 
evaluations of the current state-of-affairs including their relationship to their 
communicative partners (see Caffi and Janney, 1994). What becomes immediately 
apparent is that emotional cues are not only linguistic but multi-modal in nature. For this 
reason, it is necessary to adopt a multi-modal stance (for the importance of this stance, 
see, e.g. Jones, 2013; Norris, 2004; LeVine and Scollon, 2004; Kress and van Leeuwen, 
1996) in order to understand better how relationships are created, challenged and 
maintained through complex signalling practices. 
Research in communication studies has provided an overview of the repertoire of 
emotional cues that are recruited for interaction. For example, Planalp (1998) lists and 
discusses research on a range of vocal, verbal, body, physiological, and facial cues. This 
repertoire is presented in Table 2. These emotional signals provide the basis for 
communicating and inferring evaluative meanings, i.e. the actual emotive states (e.g. love, 
embarrassment, shame, guilt) that we display or that we attribute to our partners. Among 
these cues, facial expressions constitute the most explored set of cues. In the tradition of 
Darwin’s (1872) early studies on parallels between facial expressions between humans and 
animals, pioneering research was conducted on the basis of naturalistic observation 
(Tomkins, 1962, 1963; Izard, 1971). But most importantly, Ekman’s experimental studies 
on the recognition of emotions expressed through the face paved the way for the search 
of basic and universal sets of emotions that are associated with specific configurations of 
rapid cues in the face (Ekman and Friesen, 1975). Ekman and Friesen (1978) developed the 
Facial Action Coding System to analyze the facial 
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Table 2 
Planalp’s (1998) overview of emotional cues. 
94 
Class of cues Forms of realization  
Vocal cues Voice quality: low, loud, slow, fast, trembling, high-pitched, 
monotonous, animate voice 
Verbal cues Language-specific emotion vocabularies 
 Metaphors  
 Speech acts 
 Emotional discourse practices, e.g. therapeutic discourse 
Body cues Animated, energetic movement 
 Physical actions: throwing things, making threatening movements, 
kissing, caressing 
 Gait: walking heavily, lightly, arm swing, length/speed of stride 
 Body posture: stiff/rigid, droopy, upright 
 Hands/arms gestures: hand emblems, clenching hands or fists 
Physiological cues Blushing, pupil dilation, heart rate, breathing, skin temperature 
Facial cues Facial expressions of emotions through forehead and eyebrows, eyes 
and eyelids, and the lower face (mouth, lips, labionasal folds) 
 
expression of the six basic emotions surprise, anger, fear, sadness, happiness, and disgust. 
In a series of experiments, Ekman and his colleagues tried to show that humans employ 
the face to distinctively encode these specific emotion categories (see, e.g. Ekman and 
Friesen, 1975). These claims have not remained uncontroversial, however. Especially 
evidence from anthropological studies questions both the existence of basic emotions as 
well as their assumed universality (e.g. Heelas, 1996; Michel et al., 2006). It is shown that 
informants judge facial expressions less accurately than suggested by Ekman. This might 
speak for a less isomorphic connection between emotional categories and facial 
expressions and promote the idea that emotional states are pointed to rather than 
encoded through various semiotic channels. In other words, emotional cues indicate 
emotional orientations rather than a distinct set of emotion categories. Nevertheless, in 
psychology, Ekman’s programme has been so influential that facial emotional expression 
basically became associated with emotional expression as such. As a consequence, the 
other emotional cues received much less attention. 
The interface between the verbal and the vocal cues for emotions has been more 
prominently explored in anthropological linguistics (see, e.g. Couper-Kuhlen, 2011). To 
account for the children’s ability of learning about the world through their parents’ 
emoting, Ochs and Schieffelin (1989) developed a complex grid of emotional cues that may 
signal emotional orientations in and through language. Their framework situates 
emotional signals on all levels of linguistic organization from minute vocal cues to 
complete discourse practices. A further substantial contribution by this study consists in a 
classification of the function, the semantic scope, and the distribution of affective signals. 
From the perspective of relational work, Ochs and Schieffelin’s framework constitutes a 
comprehensive overview of the linguistic cues that interactors may recruit for symbolizing 
emotional orientations in their performance of relational work. (These dimensions will be 
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further elaborated below). In line with the idea of social referencing, interactors may 
attend to these cues to learn about the other’s evaluation of the actual social world of 
experience. However, it is important to emphasize that none of these cues encode a 
specific emotional category. Instead, they index emotional states. For instance, it is not 
always clear whether tears signal sadness or overwhelming happiness. When seeing the 
face of a crying sportsperson out of context, we cannot decide whether he/she is crying 
because of losing a race (pain/sadness) or winning an Olympic gold medal 
(happiness/satisfaction). In other words, the specific quality of these states has to be 
inferred from the cue (tears) as well as further non-verbal and contextual information. 
From a more decidedly linguistic perspective, alternative frameworks for the analysis 
of vocal or verbal cues have been proposed by Foolen (1997), Fiehler (2002), Oster (2010), 
Schwarz-Friesel (2007) or Reber (2012). They also engage with the set of potential 
linguistic vehicles for the expression and description of emotion and mention emotion 
words (e.g. love, hate), word connotations (e.g. war, party), interjections (oh, ah, geez), 
metaphors (in seventh heaven, down in the dumps), optative sentences (I wish you were 
here), etc. While it is impossible to engage with these structures in detail here, it is 
important to emphasize that the importance of analysing the emotional components in 
language is increasingly being recognized in linguistics (see, e.g. Foolen, 2012). The 
problem with most of these linguistic approaches is that they limit emotional display to 
verbal communication while ignoring the interaction of the verbal messages with other 
emotional cues. From her stance in communication studies, this research lacuna is 
explicitly highlighted by Planalp: 
Even though researchers tend to study amputated heads, decapitated bodies, disembodied 
and content-free voices, and decontextualized words, we know that in some way they go 
together. What is singularly lacking is any plausible account of how cues are combined into 
complex multichannel messages about emotion, much less accounts of how they are 
produced and interpreted. (Planalp, 1998:37) 
In line with the central tenets of the study of relational work, we suggest that a discourse-
analytical perspective on communicative signalling and sense-making allows us to bridge 
this gap as it allows a process-oriented analysis of emotional cueing in situated 
interactional practices.4 
Indeed, more multi-modal analyses of emotional signals have been developed in the 
ethnography of communication, most importantly, in the work of Charles and Marjorie 
Goodwin. Promoting an embodied view of emotional signalling within “processes of 
interaction” (Goodwin and Goodwin, 2001:253; Goodwin et al., 2002), they adopt a highly 
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4 Depending on your research question and your data situation, we agree with Spencer-Oatey (this volume), 
who studies workplace interaction and claims that interviews with participants might help in establishing 
emotional reactions by respondents in retrospect. This is especially the case if the display of emotions is 
withheld because the norms of the situation require this. In our paper, however, we wish to concentrate on 
what is observable and how to best grasp it with analytical tools. In addition, we argue that the absence of a 
marked emotional stance in itself can also have signalling force. We elaborate on this in the continuation of 
section 5 and in the conclusion. 
 
 
 
Published in: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2013.05.014 
dynamic and multi-modal view of emotional communication, suggesting that affective 
stance in relational work cannot be understood from a purely language-centric perspective 
on semiotic behaviour. This strongly supports a more comprehensive discursive-pragmatic 
approach to relational work and its emotional component that embraces multi-modality. 
“Embodied intersubjective participation” (Wilce, 2009:51) is also the focus of 
Matoesian’s (2005) close conversation-analytical reading of a focus-group interview in the 
context of a US training programme in community policing. Matoesian analyses how the 
interactors signal their stance towards the propositions made during the interview. But 
rather than regarding stance marking as a purely speaker-centred linguistic affair, 
Matoesian shows that 
[…] stance functions not only through grammar prosody and paralinguistic features, nor 
even only through the autonomous body; it also emerges interactively and incrementally in 
the embodied multimodal projection and negotiation of participation frameworks – 
through sequentially organized rhythms of language and the body. (Matoesian, 2005:169) 
From the perspective of relational work this is a striking insight, as the “emotionally 
charged recipient activity” (Matoesian, 2005:182) of the communicative partners does not 
only pare down to a matter of expressing internal bodily states and their appraisal but 
rather points to the joint and strategic management of emotional orientations within 
embodied interactional practices that integrate a variety of cues. 
As stated above, the analysis of emotionality on the basis of emotional cues alone is 
highly complicated for two reasons. First, emotional cues are often withheld or modulated 
because of social and cultural norms of display. Second, there is no direct visible link 
between emotional cues and internal emotional states. Rather, from an interactional 
perspective emotional orientations must primarily be seen as semiotic constructs that help 
the communicative partners making their evaluations of a given state-of-affairs socially 
accessible and thus socially accountable. While some cues may result from spontaneous 
expressions of genuine emotional states, other cues may be used strategically to 
emotionalize a given message in the absence of actual arousal. Degrees of control on this 
continuum from spontaneous to strategic emotional display are very difficult, if not 
impossible, to distinguish from an interaction-analytical perspective. However, we would 
like to claim that this is not of central relevance for an analysis of emotional signalling from 
this empirical vantage point. What counts as objects of analysis within an interaction-
analytical framework are the recognizable emotional displays as well as the interactional 
partners’ orientations to these displays in their communicative engagements. In this the 
analysts do not differ from the interlocutors as both have to rely on perceived cues in order 
to arrive at assumptions about intentions and emotional stance. It is worthwhile to point 
out that not every individual is equally adept in reading and interpreting emotional cues 
and that social norms are negotiated in a discursive process. This and the fact that 
emotional cues are often ambiguous and only clarified in the development of interaction 
explains that often partners misread and misinterpret emotional signalling, and that 
different people may react differently to the same emotional displays. 
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The dimension of emotion management through communication has been addressed 
in communication studies. Actually, emotion management within relational episodes is a 
highly familiar phenomenon. If we did not adapt our emotions and their display to others, 
we would not feel torn between expressing what we really feel and expressing what the 
other might wish us to express. Rather, we adapt our emotions and their expression to our 
audience in order to modulate social connections. Following Hochschild (1979), Planalp 
(1999:75–76) distinguishes two main strategies for emotion management in stage acting 
and then expands these concepts to communication in general. On the one hand, surface 
acting relates to the management of emotional expressions. This corresponds to the 
application of a number of display rules that were proposed by Ekman and Friesen (1975) 
with regard to the communicative management of facial expressions. By applying the 
display rules, communicators may change the expressive surface of their emotional states 
by simulating, inhibiting, intensifying, de-intensifying, or masking their actual emotions in 
order to follow culture-specific norms of appropriate emotional display. On the other 
hand, deep acting involves attempts to actually change one’s 
internal emotional states. We can do so by avoiding emotion-triggering situations, by 
influencing our appraisals of such situations, by manipulating our physiological reactions 
(e.g. by taking drugs), or by changing our action tendencies. 
The idea of emotion management is of central importance for the concept of relational 
work. If we can strategically manipulate our emotional orientations to influence our 
relationships with our interactional partners either through surface acting or deep acting, 
then interlocutors must be expected to pay close attention to the presence or absence of 
emotional signals for making sense of their actual social position relative to the other. This 
said, it is important to emphasize that it is impossible to investigate processes of surface 
acting or deep acting on the basis of a close reading of interactional data only. As we do 
not know about the interactors’ internal emotional states, we also do not know whether 
the emotions indexed through the multi-modal cues are ‘authentic’ or not. However, as 
argued above, this does not constitute a central problem for the impact of emotions on 
relational work as a clear distinction between the spontaneous expression and the 
strategic communication of emotional stances is basically impossible to draw as emotions 
and their displays are so deeply socialized (Planalp, 1998:31–32). 
The relational work involved in negotiating a relationship is fundamentally linked to the 
active management of evaluations in and through communication. As this emotional 
communication is subject to social and cultural norms, we can address violations of 
corresponding display rules as a final dimension for integrating emotions and relational 
work. Our performance of specific social roles is associated with social normative 
expectations of appropriate emotional states and behaviours (Hochschild, 1983; Planalp, 
1999:93--96; Culpeper, 2011; Spencer-Oatey, 2011). Emotions seem to play a role when 
satisfactions or violations of frame-based expectations and personal preferences occur. 
For instance, violations may trigger negative emotions, which will then be part and parcel 
of judgments about relational work. These situated judgements present the link to 
politeness research and to work on identity construction (cf. Locher, 2008, 2012). In Locher 
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and Langlotz (2008), we argued that emotions play a crucial role in the creation and 
interpretation of these judgments. For example, positive emotions are triggered when 
being treated politely, or negative emotions when treated rudely. A recent and interesting 
socio-cognitive model for the role of emotions in the interpretation of offence and 
impoliteness is offered by Culpeper (2011:65–70). Most importantly, he also assumes a 
close link between breaching social expectations and norms, emotional reactions and 
cognitive processes of appraisal. His approach is thus largely compatible with our own 
ideas on the link between relational work and emotions. 
Considering these insights as a challenge for developing a more comprehensive 
approach to relational work, we will now chart possible routes to account for multi-modal 
practices of emotional signalling as well as the construction of emotional meaning within 
this particular framework. 
 
6. Calvin and Susie at relational work 
We would like to sketch our own approach to this issue by engaging with the following 
cartoon. It captures the beginning of a relational episode between Calvin, one of the two 
main protagonists from Bill Watterson’s fictive ‘Calvin and Hobbes’ cartoon world, and 
Susie, his less than favourite class mate. The brief interaction takes place in the context of 
an American school (note the lockers in the background) with Calvin and Susie having been 
assigned to work together on a report (Fig. 1). 
We are very much aware of the fact that this piece of data is no substitute for the 
complexity of recorded face-to-face data of naturally occurring interaction between flesh 
and blood participants. However, the cartoon is also naturally 
 
Fig. 1. The Authoritative Calvin and Hobbes, pp. 121–124. (CALVIN AND HOBBES (c) Watterson. Used by 
permission of Universal Uclick. All rights reserved.) 
 
 
occurring in the sense that this data was neither elicited with a particular research 
question in mind nor produced for linguistic analysis as such. We realize that comic strips 
and graphic novels constitute a genre in its own right (cf. Saraceni, 2003; Kimmich, 2008; 
Adler, 2011), and consider the example suitable for an analysis of the relational and 
emotional dimensions of interaction. This is the case especially because we are presented 
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with an exaggerated and condensed representation of the combination of multi-modal 
relational cues. Following Alvarez-Pereyre (2011), who assesses the usefulness of 
telecinematic data for linguistic analysis, we make an analogous case for data from 
cartoons and argue with Alvarez-Pereyre (2011) that 
The very fact that the lexicogrammatical structures have been, carefully and non-
spontaneously, chosen to fulfill the particular functions assigned, makes them extremely 
good specimens for the study of the relationships between forms, meanings and functions. 
(Alvarez-Pereyre, 2011:62, emphasis in original) 
The target audience being adults who can appreciate the wisdom of the characters’ 
observations of the daily life of growing- up in the United States and who can grasp the 
irony and humour entailed in the episodes, draw on their cultural knowledge of the 
described scenes and include the emotional multi-modal cues in their interpretation of the 
cartoon’s message. As outside observers, the readers may appreciate the incongruity 
between Calvin’s and Susie’s rather direct and uninhibited emotional signalling in the 
context of school and the social norms of emotional signalling in an adult workplace 
context in which two people have been assigned to collaborate as a team. We assume that 
in the world of adults in a comparable cultural (Anglo Western) context, it would be 
considered highly inappropriate to express one’s emotional stance towards the 
collaborator in such an unfiltered way. Knowing about these norms and their violation 
depicted in the cartoon, we can thus laugh at Calvin’s and Susie’s exaggerated display of 
their contempt towards each other. Although fictional, this short interactional sequence 
is thus very interesting for analysing links between emotion and relational work. More 
specifically, we would like to argue that the development of Calvin and Susie’s relationship 
and our humorous appreciation of it cannot be understood, if the evaluative components 
and their situated interpretation are disregarded. In what follows, we will offer our own 
understanding and interpretation of this short sequence, being well aware that readers 
from different cultural backgrounds or with different emotional sensitivities might 
evaluate the emotional cues we will identify differently. Having said this, our purpose is to 
show a potential reading in order to demonstrate how a combination of emotional and 
relational cues influence each other in a dynamic process of sense-making. 
It is crucial to remember that in section 3 we have defined emotions as complex and 
dynamic processes. However, only their (communicative) stimuli and communicative 
expressions become accessible to the interactors and the discourse analyst. Along these 
lines, verbal cues such as Aaghh, I can’t believe, doofus, nimrod as well as Calvin and Susie’s 
body positions, gestures, and facial expressions signal emotions in the cartoon. The cues 
frame their emotional states and allow them to express and symbolize their annoyance. 
Emotional display thus works as a powerful control mechanism that provides an evaluative 
framing for both the social relationship between the school kids and the contents of their 
transaction. Thus, the protagonists’ relational work (and, of course, the readers’ reception 
and interpretation of what happens ‘between’ the boy and the girl) involves complex and 
subtle semiotic processes of positive and negative emotional signalling which provide the 
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basis for inferring corresponding evaluations. Table 3 summarizes the verbal features and 
systematizes them relative to different levels of linguistic analysis in accord with Ochs and 
Schiefflin’s (1989) classification of affect cues (see above). 
 
Table 3 
Ochs’ and Schieffelin’s (1989) classificatory grid, abbreviated for the linguistic expression of affect relevant 
to our data set. 
 
Level of analysis Type of cue Example  
Vocal features Loudness 
lengthening 
stress 
IT DOES NOT! 
(note that loudness and emphasis are 
indexed by bold capital letters and the flashy 
speech bulb in the comic strip) 
 
Morphosyntax Pronouns: the use of 3rd 
person  
pronouns to refer to the 
addressee 
 
Who takes her sandwiches apart and eats 
each ingredient separately? 
Lexicon Interjections aaghh 
 descriptive terms for 
humans 
doofus  
grade ‘A’ nimrod 
 
Discourse structure Affective speech acts:  
 Laments I can’t believe we were assigned to do a 
report together! 
 Threats You’d better do a great job! 
 Exclamations What’s wrong with that?! 
In line with Ochs and Schieffelin’s framework we can further analyze the function, the 
semantic scope, and the distribution of these affective signals. First, the authors 
distinguish between affect specifiers and affect intensifiers (Ochs and Schieffelin, 1989:14–
15). While the former specify the emotional orientation of an utterance, the latter rather 
modulate its affective intensity. Thus, Calvin’s interjection Aaghh can be seen as an affect 
intensifier, whereas I can’t believe specifies Calvin’s exasperation. Concerning the scope 
of such cues, a distinction is made between signals that evaluate a given referent (e.g. 
doofus for Calvin), cues that evaluate a full proposition (e.g. I can’t believe emotionally 
frames the proposition we were assigned to do a report together), and cues that are linked 
to a sequence of propositions (Ochs and Schieffelin, 1989:15–18). Finally, affective signals 
can appear in three positions relative to an utterance. Initiators, such as Aaghh, I can’t 
believe, occur at the beginning and cast an emotional shadow onto the subsequent 
proposition. Concurrents provide emotional information along with the statement that is 
being made as in WHAT’S WRONG WITH THAT?! Here Susie raises her voice while making 
her point. Finally, terminators may be placed at the end of an utterance to provide an 
emotional evaluation after a given proposition is made. To provide an example, we can 
modify Calvin’s initial statement into We were assigned to do a report together, poor me! 
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These emotional signals play a decisive role for the construal of the relationship. The 
relational work between Calvin and Susie thus involves a complex interplay between three 
dimensions. By scrutinizing the first panel, these dimensions can be outlined as follows: 
a. The construal of conceptual content: When Calvin states we were assigned to do a 
report together, he asserts a fact that changes his world of social experience. Doing 
a report together implies teamwork and the formation of a relationship. 
b. The construal of the relationship: Calvin’s undesired relationship to Susie stands at 
the centre of his assertion. To highlight the emerging, novel social constellation, 
we is used as a person deictic that points to the two interactors. The discursive 
negotiation of the interactors’ self-images relative to their unwilling relationship is 
the main theme of the subsequent panels. 
c. Calvin’s emotional evaluation of a. and b.: Calvin’s emotional evaluation, i.e. his 
exasperation is shown in a highly multi-modal form involving his hand gestures, the 
reclined body position, the sigh Aaghh as well as the expression I can’t believe. In 
the first panel, the negative evaluation of the assertion we were assigned to do a 
report together is primarily evoked and mediated through these signals. 
While this list seems to suggest that these three dimensions of signalling and sense-making 
are separable, we prefer to argue that they stand in a reciprocal relationship, which 
connects them inextricably. Although some signals such as the personal pronoun we or 
the interjection aaghh seem to be specialized for the coordination of relational and 
evaluative meaning, respectively, the whole utterance and the accompanying non-verbal 
cues merge into a complex composite signal (Clark, 1996:178–179, see below). In addition, 
we can see that the interactional negotiation of these evaluations is managed through a 
discursive process of co-constructing this relational meaning by mutually orienting to their 
appraisals of the assignment-task, their emotional perspective on future collaboration, as 
well as their evaluation of each other. 
It is important to note that from a linguistic perspective it is not relevant whether Calvin 
is truly annoyed and exasperated. Of course, Calvin does not exist beyond the interesting 
cluster of lines that was created by Watterson. Hence, genuine emotions are not involved 
in our example. However, the comic strip manages to create the fictional illusion of 
emotionality at work. As readers we interpret Calvin’s emotional signals as expressing his 
emotional stance to Susie to influence her strategically and to let her know that she cannot 
expect too much cooperation from him. With regard to Calvin’s performance within the 
world of the cartoon this would mean that Calvin may indeed spontaneously feel 
exasperated. But through socialization he would also have learned how to 
intersubjectively signal and to construct this emotional state for its recognition by Susie. 
The communicative manipulation of Susie’s attention in line with the idea of exasperation 
therefore cannot be understood without reference to non-spontaneous, culture-specific 
norms of emotional display. It is these norms that we can rely on as readers to attribute 
evaluative meaning to Calvin’s utterance in the first panel. 
From the initial analysis of this comic strip we can therefore distill a number of key 
insights with regard to the connection between relational work and emotion as illustrated 
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in Fig. 2. The relationship is the product that emerges from the interplay of the following 
simultaneous dimensions: 
 First, we have claimed that relationships are social constructs that emerge 
dynamically through joint practices that contain emotional components (A). 
 In the cartoon, we must thus scrutinize the dynamic activation of multi-modal 
repertoire of vocal, verbal, bodily, and facial cues (B). 
 
 
Fig. 2. Emotional components in relational work in the comic strip and their interpretation by the reader. 
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 On the cognitive plane, the multi-modal signalling strategies guide and shape joint 
and intersubjective processes of inferring relational meaning (C).  
 In this process, the interactional partners manage their emotional displays relative 
to their relational goals (D). 
 Emotional orientations thus emerge as semiotic constructs. This emotional 
communication results in enhancing, maintaining or reducing the sense of 
relationship between the interactional partners (E). 
 This process of emotional sanctioning works relative to moral norms of appropriate 
behaviour and interactional norms of emotional display (F). 
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 The fictional display of Calvin and Susie’s emotional signals is interpreted by the 
reader who must activate his/her socio-cultural knowledge of emotional display in 
school and other contexts in order to interpret the relational work performed in 
the cartoon (G). 
In the next section we want to explore these topics in further detail. By offering our 
own interpretation of the brief interaction between Calvin and Susie, we therefore move 
from these theoretical considerations to the more practical question of how emotional 
signals can be analyzed in this concrete instance of relational work. 
 
7. Relationship construction through multi-modal emotional display 
In this section we will address the challenge of handling the discursive management of 
relationship evaluation through multi-modal and composite emotional signals in 
interaction. In doing so we will make use of Clark’s seminal work on Using Language from 
1996, more specifically his semiotic model of communicative signalling. He proposes that 
interactors do not merely encode meanings into symbolic units but rather engage in 
complex processes of multimodal signalling for describing, indicating, and demonstrating 
their stances to one another. Describing is seen as the method of signalling that is based 
on symbolic convention -- centrally but not exclusively it involves linguistic communication 
(e.g. I am sad). Indicating is used to point to a contiguous object or referent (e.g. turning 
away from the communicative partner to index annoyance). Demonstrating is a form of 
imitating a phenomenon (e.g. reproducing the surprised facial expression of another 
person during a story-telling event). 
Moreover, Clark highlights that the creation of meaning is achieved by joint actions in 
which the speaker and the listener simultaneously play active roles on four different levels: 
(1) executing behaviours and attending to them, (2) presenting signals and identifying 
them, (3) signalling meanings and recognizing them, and (4) proposing a joint project and 
considering this joint project. Thus, signalling is a dynamic process that requires 
coordination and fine-tuning between the partners in a conversation. 
We agree with Clark that communicative actions must be joint actions in which both 
the speaker and the listener play an active role. For the purpose of our analysis, we will 
not be able to present the finer details of Clark’s theory here. However, following Clark, 
we assume that emotional signals have a complex, composite structure, which emerges in 
dynamic processes of emotional signalling that are displayed for reception by the 
interactional partner(s) (Planalp and Knie, 2002). In an actual conversation, speakers 
beyond producing their own emotional displays are also reacting to the emotional 
reactions of the recipients while ‘formulating’. At the same time, listeners are both 
reacting to and interpreting the speaker’s emotional signals to evaluate what is being said 
consciously as well as unconsciously.5 Note that these displays are complex signals that 
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5 This is in line with the very recent Geneva Multimodal Emotion Portrayals (GEMEP) corpus that was 
developed in the context of the NCCR Affective Sciences: Emotion in Individual Behaviour and Social Processes 
(Bänziger and Scherer, 2010) and includes multimodal performances of emotions. This corpus is based on 
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are assembled from the repertoire of verbal and non-verbal cues that were presented in 
Tables 2 and 3. On the basis of these cues, the communicators can signal evaluations to 
the recipient and invite him/her to engage with the proposed appraisal. In other words, 
acts of creating evaluations involve both the signalling of these evaluations through 
emotional cues and their potential take-up. In what follows, we will first discuss the multi-
modal nature of emotional signalling and then discuss the complex process of creating 
evaluative meanings through the dynamically evoked composite signals. 
 
7.1 Multi-modal acts of emotional signalling 
Clark’s view of signalling questions language-centred models of communication (Clark, 
1996:Ch. 6). He rejects the idea that communicative signals are primarily ‘linguistic’ 
objects. By integrating other communicative modalities, Clark instead claims that signals 
are composite signals that are constructed by linguistic and non-linguistic methods of 
signalling. Thus, non-linguistic methods of signalling are not considered crude and 
unsystematic but part and parcel of communicative acts. 
With reference to Peirce’s (1977) theory of signs, Clark develops a dynamic theory of 
signalling. He does not regard signs as static units that are merely recruited as vehicles for 
encoding meaning. Instead, 
[…] signaling is a mixture of three methods--describing-as, indicating and demonstrating. 
Describing-as is the only method that uses symbols, and it never works alone. In 
conversation, indicating is always required too. Of the three methods, demonstrating is the 
most neglected, yet is essential to everything from quotations to intonation to iconic 
gestures. (Clark, 1996:188) 
Through the three methods of signalling composite signals are created online and 
designed for the identification by the recipient (Clark, 1996:178–179). By definition, 
composite signals are multi-modal, i.e. they recruit several instruments by means of which 
the communicators can ‘manipulate’ the semiotic landscape (Table 4). 
Table 4 
Methods and instruments of signalling. 
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 Method of signalling  
Instrument Describing-as Indicating Demonstrating  
Voice 
Hands 
Arms 
Body 
Face 
Eyes 
COMPOSITE SIGNAL 
 
Adapted from Clark (1996). 
 
 
 
                                               
actor portrayals and is designed for experimental research. 
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Fig. 3. Composite emotional signal. 
 
The composite nature of communicative signals can again be illustrated by means of 
the first panel of our comic strip. Calvin’s interjection Aaghh can be seen as a form of 
indicating. Note that interjections have been treated controversially in linguistics (for an 
overview see Schwarz-Friesel, 2007:157). Interjections like Aaghh do not have a 
conventionalized symbolic meaning. Here the lengthened production of the vocalic sound 
indexes Calvin’s inner state of exasperation. On the other hand, interjections are usually 
positioned like sentence adverbs. Calvin’s Aaghh is left-peripheral and therefore works as 
an initiator that evaluates the subsequent propositions through its negative emotional 
evaluation. Of course, in the strip this indexicality is added by the orthographic 
representation of the vocalic element. However, the reader is assumed to interpolate that 
in the world of the comic strip Calvin produces a vocal emotional cue. His use of I can’t 
believe, however, is a symbolic act of describing his emotional state. Finally, he uses hand 
gestures and a facial expression of exasperation and is thus indicating his emotional stance 
through the body. Calvin’s behaviours combine into a composite signal that, crucially, is 
designed for his addressee, Susie (Fig. 3). We can look at the entire stretch of interaction 
and analyze the three ways of signalling, describing-as, indicating and demonstrating with 
respect to how they are transmitted. This transmission is not achieved by language (or 
voice) only, but by the full repertoire of emotional cues sketched above. Let us first point 
out a couple of examples related to the voice as an instrument. This involves both vocal 
and verbal cues. In the category ‘describing as’, we find the exclamation I can’t believe 
(panel 1), name calling doofus (panel 2 and 3), grade “A” nimrod (panel 4), and word 
connotations flunk (panel 2). In the category indicating, we observe sighing Aaghh (panel 
1). We also see the surprised/shocked, exasperated intonations for Calvin’s A DOOFUS?? 
and Susie’s WHAT’S WRONG WITH THAT?! that are indexed by?? and?!, respectively in 
panel 3. Moreover, there is shouting as in IT DOES NOT! In the graphic format of the 
comics, this is indicated by bigger capital letters in bold and the flashy speech bubble. 
When turning to the analysis of the hands, arms and body posture as instruments for 
bodily gestures, we can highlight the following. In the category indicating, we can observe 
Susie’s pointing finger as a bodily indicator of the direction of her verbal attack against 
Calvin in panel 2. We also see how Calvin reacts to Susie’s attack when adopting a self-
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confident pose in panel 3 by placing his hands on his hips. Moreover, in panel 4, Calvin 
crosses his arms and turns away his body to indicate a defensive position against Susie’s 
outraged exclamation. With regard to body posture Calvin’s backward leaning body in 
panels 1 and 3 signal flight and reclining away from Susie, whereas Susie’s forward leaning 
in panels 2 
 
Table 5 
Calvin’s and Susie’s composite emotional signals in panel 4. 
 
102 
 Method of signalling    
Instrument Describing-as  Indicating  
 Calvin Susie Calvin Susie 
Voice letters Grade “A” 
nimrod 
  Use of capitals and flashy speech 
bubble for shouting 
Hand(s)     
Arm(s)   Crossed Pulled down 
Body   Turned away from 
Susie 
Leaning forward 
Face   Eyes closed Hard stare 
Piercing eyes 
Eyebrows pulled down and 
together 
 
and 4 underlines her attacks. We further see Calvin’s and Susie’s gestures of exasperation 
and/or desperation in panels 1 and 3, respectively. Both of them raise their arms upwards 
to convey their emotional agitation.6 
Concerning the face and eyes we can point out that Calvin refuses eye contact in the 
first and fourth panel. This can be interpreted as indicating his negative evaluation of her. 
In panels 3 and 4 Calvin and Susie point to their anger through the face by their hard stares, 
piercing eyes and by pulling their eyebrows down and together (see Ekman and Friesen, 
1975:97). 
In the flow of the interaction, the different channels for emotional expression operate 
in conjunction for the display of composite emotional signals. The composite signals for 
panel 4 are summarized in Table 5. Calvin describes Susie as a grade “A” nimrod. This 
creative compound undermines the positive connotations of the highest school grade by 
adding it as a premodifier to the head nimrod. In other words, nimrod can be interpreted 
as a terminator that casts a highly negative appraisal on Susie and her superior status 
within the world of the school. Calvin’s verbal act is accompanied by his arm and body 
position. He turns away from Susie and crosses his arms. Moreover, he closes his eyes. In 
combination these signals iconically show how Calvin attempts to withdraw from her 
physically. This act is again countered by a composite emotional signal by Susie. Her anger 
is indicated in her facial expression and by her shouting IT DOES NOT! (Again, note that 
 
                                               
6 We interpret these gestures as indexes. Depending on their degree of conventionality, they could also be 
classified as symbolic gestures for exasperation and thus work as acts of describing-as. This shows that the 
distinction between conventional and spontaneous bodily signals for emotions is very difficult to draw. 
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shouting is indexed through the comic strip convention of capitalizing the letters; Saraceni, 
2003:20). These displays of anger are further supported by the arm and body position. Her 
pulled down arms and her forward leaning posture indicate her emotional attack against 
Calvin. (Since neither Calvin nor Susie explicitly quote/imitate the emotional signals by 
another person, we cannot find any instances of demonstrating in the short sequence.) 
These multi-modal acts of signalling manage emotional evaluations and thus influence the 
potential interpretation and take-up of the semiotic construction of Calvin and Susie’s 
relationship. Our interpretation of this construction of evaluative meanings relative to the 
composite emotional signals in the four panels is offered in the next section. 
 
7.2. The dynamic construal of relationship evaluations 
The different emotional cues are combined into complex arrangements of composite 
signals. They reflect the mutually adaptive and intersubjective coordination of the 
interactors’ emotional orientations. Through these semiotic tools they can dynamically 
‘manipulate’ the emotion-related semiotic environment for apprehension, 
comprehension, and take-up by the interactional partners. We can thus use Calvin and 
Susie’s actions as an analytical starting point to illustrate how relational work is supported 
by complex semiotic acts of displaying emotions. We will further address some challenges 
for more extensive empirical work on the basis of naturally occurring data at the end of 
this paper. In a nutshell, we see acts of emotional signalling realized in different ways. In 
section 6 we have argued that the creation of meaning for the construction of social 
orientation is based on a complex reciprocal relationship between conceptual content, 
relational meaning, and emotional evaluation. 
So let us scrutinize the dynamic construal of Calvin’s evaluation of their interpersonal 
relationship in panel 1. As we have argued, Calvin shows us an emotional evaluation by 
uttering: Aaghh I can’t believe. Working as an initiator in the sense proposed by Ochs and 
Schieffelin (1989), these verbal cues provide an emotional contextualisation that place the 
rest of the message, i.e. the propositional content we were assigned to do a report 
together, under the given affective scope. Moreover, Aaghh functions as an affect 
intensifier and I can’t believe specifies Calvin’s state of exasperation. Calvin’s emotional 
orientation is further supported by the non-verbal dimensions of Calvin’s composite signal. 
The raised arm further intensifies his emotional agitation. The hand gesture of covering 
his eyes to closing his view from Susie as well as his reclined body posture signal his 
aversive appraisal of her as a project partner. Along these lines, Calvin provides a negative 
evaluation of both the assignment and the work relationship, which is indicated by the we, 
at the very beginning of the interaction. Susie takes this pessimistic framing of their joint 
future engagement up in the next panel. 
In reaction to Calvin’s stance, Susie produces an act that also combines conceptual 
content, relational meaning, and emotional evaluation: All I can say is you’d better do a 
great job! This is a bossy threat that places Susie in a superior and commanding position. 
The threat is underlined non-verbally by Susie’s pointing finger and her forward leaning 
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body position. The threat is followed by an account: I don’t want to flunk just because I 
was assigned a doofus for a partner. Here, Susie distances herself emotionally from the 
joint venture and Calvin. Semiotically, this negative appraisal is signalled by the negative 
word connotation of the verb flunk, which evokes the school frame, and the derogatory 
name doofus. This word combines social and emotional meaning in a synthetic way. By 
calling Calvin a doofus she appraises his intellectual capacities in highly negative terms and 
thus positions herself as in an intellectually superior position. Moreover, she distances 
herself from Calvin by not addressing him directly, but by talking about a partner. Thus, 
while she attacks Calvin on a non-verbal level by her forward body she simultaneously 
increases the symbolic distance to him by uttering her non-flattering comparison. 
In the third panel, Calvin takes up Susie’s proposal for defining their relationship by 
expressing his shocked surprise and disbelief A DOOFUS?? The intensity of this appraisal is 
marked by the bold capital letters. Adopting a self-confident body position and putting on 
an angry face, Calvin himself produces a counter-argument to Susie’s impertinent act of 
social categorization: Who takes her sandwiches apart and eats each ingredient 
separately? Thus, Calvin produces a negative evaluation of Susie’s social image and 
sanctions her previous act of social positioning by pointing to her unconventional eating 
behaviours. Instead of characterizing her as intellectually superior, the image of Susie 
disassembling her sandwich into its atomic parts conceptualizes her as a nit-picking control 
freak with analytical capacities but no sense for enjoying the sensory pleasures of life. 
Moreover, rather than highlighting her intellectual superiority, it points to Susie’s practical 
deficiencies. It is important to note that Calvin uses the third person pronoun her as a 
person deictic to distance himself from his addressee. Susie’s reaction to this is an 
emotional re-evaluation of Calvin’s comment that questions the supposed non-conformity 
of her behaviour. To save her social image, she exclaims: WHAT’S WRONG WITH THAT?! 
The raised voice and arms display the emotional arousal triggered by Calvin’s symbolic 
sanctioning of her habits. She seems to be both in despair and scandalized by his act of 
retribution. This is also performed through her body posture, which reclines back and away 
from Calvin. 
In the fourth panel, Calvin adds further fuel to the fire. His retort It certifies you as a 
grade “A” nimrod nicely takes-up Susie’s act of social categorization through derogatory 
name calling, but blends this symbolic gesture with the school-discourse of grading and 
certification (it certifies you as a …). The compound grade “A” nimrod undermines Susie’s 
superior status within the world of the school. This act again triggers an angry 
contradiction by Susie (IT DOES NOT!) that sanctions Calvin’s act of negative social 
categorization. In order to conclude our discussion, we will bring the different threads of 
reasoning together in our final section. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Published in: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2013.05.014 
8. Conclusions: modelling emotional contributions in relational work – 
challenges for future research 
This paper took the research gap on the role of emotions within (im)politeness research 
as a starting point to review the existing literature on emotions in an endeavour to make 
the research insights usable for interpersonal pragmatics. Next to reviewing what the 
literature had to say on the nature of emotions, we also asked 
- How are emotions signalled in interaction and how is the communication of 
emotions influenced by social and cultural norms? 
- What are the links between emotions and interpersonal relationships? 
In our analysis we see three main instances of clashes of expectations in connection with 
norms that are evident in Susie’s and Calvin’s interaction -- two inside and one outside the 
fictional world of the comic strip. The first one, at the very beginning, occurs when Calvin 
expresses his dissatisfaction with Susie as a partner for the school assignment. This implies 
that he has an ideal conceptualisation of a project partner -- and Susie does not fit. Susie 
in turn implies that Calvin jeopardizes her success in the project and is thus also less than 
ideal as a partner. The second instance of clash of expectations is centred on ‘ways of 
eating a sandwich’. Calvin exposes Susie’s habits as not confirming to his expectations of 
a norm and evaluates her social image negatively. She takes the bait and defends herself 
by challenging 
his implicit norms. The last break of expectation occurs between the two kids’ rather 
explicit negative emotional display which runs against the adult norms of face-maintaining 
behaviour in accord with emotional display rules. It is important to point out that these 
interpretations rely on knowledge of interaction within a particular cultural context -- in 
this case US Western norms. These norms are not universally shared nor does our pointing 
out of emotional cues imply that all readers will necessarily read this sequence of panels 
in exactly the same way. What we have offered is a potential reading of interaction that 
combines relational and emotional cues, which shows that both go hand in hand when 
constructing social meaning. 
Our analysis of Calvin and Susie’s joint relational episode has shown that the series of 
panels nicely reflects the coordinated practice of relational work that is performed by the 
two school kids. The interactors are caught in an interaction chain of mutual social 
positioning and emotional evaluation. Their emotional states and appraisals cannot be 
seen as purely personal, internal affairs. Rather, the emotional orientations are managed 
by Calvin and Susie to negotiate their developing relationship and to reach their private 
relational goals. Along these lines, the cartoon reveals how practices of relational work are 
inextricably connected to semiotic acts of displaying emotions. In what follows, we would 
like to address some of the more specific challenges and make suggestions for future 
empirical work on analysing emotional displays in relational work. 
One obvious reservation concerning the use of the Calvin and Hobbes cartoon to 
illustrate our theoretical points about the signalling of emotional orientations in relational 
work concerns the fictional and stylized nature of the analyzed data. At this point it is 
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important to reconsider that we are dealing with a comic strip here that creates a highly 
comical and fictionalized account of creating an interpersonal relationship of two US 
school children. Our analysis can thus be questioned as it does not reflect natural 
interactional data. However, by way of contrast, we would like to claim that the comic 
strip serves our aim of illustrating the role of emotions in relational work. First, for the 
comic strip to work, the emotional cues must be drawn in a way that allows the reader to 
appreciate their evaluative impact. In other words, the displayed signals allow us to 
construct the fictional social world that is established between Calvin and Susie at school 
in a surprisingly rich way. Second, the non-conventional and rather direct use of emotional 
display exchanged between the two kids leads to a humorous incongruity effect with the 
adult world. Readers might appreciate the kids’ frank use of emotional display as they are 
reminded of what they might often like to display but usually cannot when in a workplace 
(or other) situation. Indeed, Calvin and Susie’s ‘speech’ acts do not seem to conform to 
the adult Anglo Western norm of emotional display rules that would be expected from the 
social context of collaborative work. 
While the data chosen for this paper was drawn from a cartoon and from a conflict 
situation, we would like to suggest that the same discursive negotiations of relational 
meaning occur in (face-to-face) interaction of any kind. Of course, it goes without saying 
that our ideas will have to be further developed against more naturally occurring data. For 
example, similar kinds of signalling one’s emotional orientation may occur in heated 
(political) debates on TV or private rows, which are more difficult to access and record 
audio-visually (see, e.g. Mondada, 2006). 
When scrutinizing naturally occurring data one also has to be acutely aware of the fact 
that emotional display rules may suppress explicit emotional signalling in a given 
interaction. This, however, does not deny the role of the emotional component in 
interaction, which seems crucial to us and warrants further research. More precisely, one 
has to account for the fact that speech events are associated with unmarked, but expected 
conventions for emotional displays. Accordingly, we claim that the signalling of evaluations 
through emotional displays is present in any interactional speech event although such 
displays may evade our attention because they often remain unmarked. For instance, an 
academic lecture is associated with a certain manner of displaying one’s ‘neutral’ and 
‘objective’ but ‘engaged’ emotional orientation by adopting a specific tone of voice, 
making academic lexical choices, providing certain body postures and facial expressions 
that reflect the ‘bodily hexis’ (Bourdieu, 1977:90–92) of lecturing. So while not being as 
salient, obvious, and marked as in our Calvin and Hobbes example, these cues are still 
relevant for negotiating the subtle relationship between a lecturer and his/her audience. 
Along these lines, we would like to argue that future empirical work will have to 
investigate much more deeply into the tension between unmarked, conventional and 
therefore expected emotional displays and highly marked ones as well as the 
consequences of adhering and deviating from these conventions for doing relational work. 
What happens in an interaction when emotional displays do not follow the expected 
norm? Will such deviations always trigger relational interpretations and corresponding 
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communicative behaviours? What happens when emotions are under-displayed rather 
than exaggerated? For instance, when the receiver of a gift does not show the expected 
signals of joy, will this result in the giver inferring a negative evaluation of the gift and thus 
a rejection of him/herself as a person? And how will the giver show this to the receiver to 
manage their relationship communicatively? Answering such questions will provide us 
with a more substantial empirical basis for detailing how the emotional and the relational 
are connected and become visible in interactions. 
Having said this, let us emphasize again that we do not claim that the full emotional 
world of the communicative partners is always signalled to the other. Nor do we claim that 
different interactors and observers will always interpret emotional cues in the same way 
as they are highly complex and can often only be disambiguated in context. However, we 
do claim that those emotional orientations that are signalled as well as the striking absence 
of expected emotional displays must be considered to play an important role for the study 
of relational work as a discursive phenomenon. 
Going beyond the level of social conventionality, we may also ask how ways of 
displaying emotions are associated with individual temperament and character rather 
than merely adhering to social and cultural norms. One can hypothesize that interactors 
frequently implement person-specific forms of emotional display for particular situations 
and that the recipients calibrate more person-based expectations against the social-
conventional benchmark of appropriate emotional conduct. But where is this line between 
the personal and the social and how is it negotiated in actual interactions? 
Finally, by drawing on Clark’s differentiation between describing-as, indicating and 
demonstrating, we attempted to dissect the emotional element of a composite signal and 
to show its relevance for the creation of relational meaning in interaction. We are aware 
of the fact that such composite signals do not always have a straightforward and 
unambiguous emotional meaning but that those signals often depend on further 
contextual information to become disambiguated and unfold their full evaluative 
potential. The actual composition and patterning of composite emotional signals and their 
interpretation by the interactors in situ thus constitutes another pertinent area of research 
for a more fine-grained empirical investigation into the relationship between emotional 
displays and their impact on relational work. 
 
Acknowledgments 
We would like to thank the editors and the anonymous reviewers for their constructive 
and much valued criticism. 
 
References 
Adler, Silvia, 2011. Silence in the graphic novel. Journal of Pragmatics 43 (9), 2278–2285.  
Alvarez-Pereyre, Michael, 2011. Using film as linguistic specimen: theoretical and practical issues. 
In: Piazza, Roberta, Bednarek, Monika, Rossi, Fabio (Eds.), Telecinematic Discourse. 
105 
 
 
 
Published in: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2013.05.014 
Approaches to the Language of Films and Television Series. John Benjamins, Amsterdam, pp. 
47–67.  
Andersen, Peter A., Guerrero, Laura K. (Eds.), 1998a. Handbook of Communication and Emotion: 
Research, Theory, Applications, and Contexts. Academic Press, San Diego.  
Andersen, Peter A., Guerrero, Laura K., 1998b. Principles of communication and emotion in social 
interaction. In: Andersen, Peter A., Guerrero, Laura K. (Eds.), Handbook of Communication 
and Emotion: Research, Theory, Applications, and Contexts. Academic Press, San Diego, pp. 
49–96.  
Arundale, Robert B., 2010. Relating. In: Locher, M.A., Graham, S.L. (Eds.), Interpersonal 
Pragmatics. Mouton, Berlin, pp. 137–166.  
Bänziger, T., Scherer, K.R., 2010. Introducing the Geneva Multimodal Emotion Portrayal (GEMEP) 
corpus. In: Scherer, K.R., Bänziger, T., Roesch, E.B. (Eds.), Blueprint for Affective computing: A 
Sourcebook. Oxford University Press, Oxford, England, pp. 271–294.  
Baumeister, Roy F., Leary, Mary, 1995. The need to belong: desire for interpersonal attachments 
as a fundamental human motivation. Psychological Bulletin 177, 497–529.  
Bourdieu, Pierre, 1977. Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.  
Bråten, Stein (Ed.), 2007. On Being Moved: From Mirror Neurons to Empathy. John Benjamins, 
Amsterdam and Philadelphia.  
Bühler, Karl H., 1934. Sprachtheorie. Fischer, Jena.  
Caffi, Claudia, Janney, Richard W., 1994. Toward a pragmatics of emotive communication. 
Journal of Pragmatics 22 (3–4), 325–373.  
Clark, Herbert H., 1996. Using Language. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.  
Couper-Kuhlen, Elizabeth, 2011. Affectivity in cross-linguistic and cross-cultural perspective. In: 
Stehl, Thomas (Ed.), Sprachen in mobilisierten Kultur: Aspekte der Migrationslinguistik. 
Universitätsverlag, Potsdam, pp. 231–257.  
Culpeper, Jonathan, 2011. Impoliteness: Using Language to Cause Offence. Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge.  
Damasio, Antonio, 1994. Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain. Penguin, 
London.  
Damasio, Antonio, 1999. The Feeling of What Happens: Body and Emotion in the Making of 
Consciousness. Harcourt, Orlando.  
Damasio, Antonio, 2003. Looking for Spinoza. Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain. Harcourt, 
Orlando.  
Darwin, Charles, 1872. The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals. Watts, London. 
Ekman, Paul, 1973. Darwin and Facial Expression. Academic Press, New York.  
Ekman, Paul, 2003. Emotions Revealed. Recognizing Faces and Feelings to Improve 
Communication and Emotional Life. Times Books, New York.  
Ekman, Paul, Friesen, Wallace V., 1975. Unmasking the Face: A Guide to Recognizing Emotions 
from Facial Expressions. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ.  
Ekman, Paul, Friesen, Wallace V., 1978. Facial Action Coding System: A Technique for the 
Measurement of Facial Movement. Consulting Psychologists Press, Palo Alto, CA.  
Fiehler, Reinhard, 2002. How to do emotions with words: emotionality in conversations. In: 
Fussell Susan, R (Ed.), The Verbal Communication of Emotions: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. 
Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ, pp. 79–106.  
 
 
 
Published in: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2013.05.014 
Foolen, Ad, 1997. The expressive function of language. Towards a cognitive semantic approach. 
In: Niemeier Susanne, Driven René, (Eds.), The Language of Emotions: Conceptualization, 
Expression, and Theoretical Foundation. John Benjamins, Amsterdam/Philadelphia, pp. 15–
32.  
Foolen, Ad, 2012. The relevance of emotion for language and linguistics. In: Foolen, Ad, Lüdtke, 
Ulrike, Racine, Tim, Zlatev, Jordan (Eds.), Moving Ourselves, Moving Others: Motion & 
Emotion in Intersubjectivity, Consciousness and Language. John Benjamins, Amsterdam, pp. 
349–369.  
Foolen, Ad, Lüdtke, U., Racine, Tim, Zlatev, Jordan (Eds.), 2012. Moving Ourselves, Moving 
Others: Motion and Emotion in Intersubjectivity, Consciousness and Language. John 
Benjamins, Amsterdam.  
Frijda, Nico H., Mesquita, Batja, 1994. The social roles and functions of emotions. In: Markus, 
H.R., Kitayama, S. (Eds.), Emotion and Culture. American Psychological Association, New York, 
pp. 51–87.  
Goddard, Clifford, 2002. Explicating emotions across languages and cultures: a semantic 
approach. In: Fussell, S.R. (Ed.), The Verbal Communication of Emotions: Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives: Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, NJ, pp. 19–53.  
Goleman, Daniel, 1995. Emotional Intelligence: Why it Can Matter More than IQ. Bantam Books, 
New York.  
Goodwin, Marjorie H., Goodwin, Charles, 2001. Emotion within situated activity. In: Duranti, A. 
(Ed.), Linguistic Anthropology: A Reader. Blackwell, Malden, MA, pp. 239–257.  
Goodwin, Marjorie H., Goodwin, Charles, Yaeger-Dror, Malcah, 2002. Multimodality in girls’ 
game disputes. Journal of Pragmatics 34, 1621–1649.  
Griffiths, Paul E., 1997. What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories. 
University of Chicago Press, Chicago.  
Halliday, Michael A.K., 1975. Learning How to Mean. Edward Arnold, London.  
Harré, Rom (Ed.), 1986a. The Social Construction of the Emotions. Blackwell, Oxford.  
Harré, Rom, 1986b. An outline of the social constructionist viewpoint. In: Harré, R. (Ed.), The 
Social Construction of the Emotions. Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 2–14.  
Harré, Rom, Finlay-Jones, Robert, 1986. Emotion talk across times. In: Harré, R. (Ed.), The Social 
Construction of the Emotions. Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 220–233.  
Heelas, Paul, 1996. Emotion talk across cultures. In: Harré, R., Parrot, W.G. (Eds.), The Emotions. 
Sage, London, pp. 171–199.  
Hochschild, Arlie R., 1979. Emotion work, feeling rules, and social structure. American Journal of 
Sociology 85, 551–575.  
Hochschild, Arlie R., 1983. The Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling. University 
of California Press, Berkeley.  
Izard, Caroll E., 1971. The Face of Emotion. Appleton-Century-Crofts, New York.  
Jakobson, Roman, 1960. Closing statements: linguistics and poetics. In: Seboek, Th.A. (Ed.), Style 
In Language. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, pp. 350–377.  
Jay, Timothy, Janschewitz, Kristin, 2007. Filling the emotion gap in linguistic theory: commentary 
of Potts’ expressive dimension. Theoretical Linguisitics 33 (2), 215–221.  
Jing-Schmidt, Zhou, 2007. Negativity bias in language: a cognitive-affective model of emotive 
intensifiers. Cognitive Linguistics 18 (3), 417–443.  
106 
 
 
 
Published in: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2013.05.014 
Jones, Rodney, 2013. Multimodal discourse analysis. In: Chapelle, Carol E. (Ed.), The Encyclopedia 
of Applied Linguistics. Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, UK.  
Kimmich, Mathias, 2008. Disorienting visualisations: adapting Paul Auster’s City of Glass. SPELL: 
Swiss Papers in English Language and Literature 21, 87–104.  
Kress, Gunther, van Leeuwen, Theo, 1996. Reading Images: The Grammar of Visual Design. 
Routledge, London.  
Langlotz, Andreas, 2010. Social cognition. In: Locher, M.A., Graham, S.L. (Eds.), Interpersonal 
Pragmatics. Mouton, Berlin, pp. 167–202.  
Languages of Emotion Cluster of Excellence at the Freie Universität Berlin. Available from: 
http://www.languages-of-emotion.de/ (accessed 27.01.13).  
LeVine, Philip, Scollon, Ron (Eds.), 2004. Discourse and Technology: Multimodal Discourse 
Analysis. Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC.  
Locher, Miriam A., 2004. Power and Politeness in Action: Disagreements in Oral Communication. 
Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin.  
Locher, Miriam A., 2008. Relational work, politeness and identity construction. In: Antos, G., 
Ventola, E., Weber, T. (Eds.), Handbooks of Applied Linguistics. Vol. 2: Interpersonal 
Communication. Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin, pp. 509–540.  
Locher, Miriam A., 2012. Politeness research from past to future, with a special focus on the 
discursive approach. In: Lucía, Fernandez Amaya, Lopez, Maria de la O. Hernandez, Reyes, 
Gomez Moron, Manuel, Padilla Cruz, Manuel, Mejias Borrero, Mariana, Relinque Barranca 
(Eds.), New Perspectives on (Im)Politeness and Interpersonal Communication. Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, Cambridge, pp. 1–22.  
Locher, Miriam A., 2013. Politeness. In: Chapelle, Carol E. (Ed.), The Encyclopedia of Applied 
Linguistics. Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, UK.  
Locher, Miriam A., Graham, Sage Lambert, 2010. Introduction to interpersonal pragmatics. In: 
Locher, M.A., Graham, S.L. (Eds.), Interpersonal Pragmatics. Mouton, Berlin, pp. 1–13.  
Locher, Miriam A., Langlotz, Andreas, 2008. Relational work: at the intersection of cognition, 
interaction and emotion. Bulletin Suisse de Linguistique Appliquée (VALS-ASLA) 88, 165–191.  
Locher, Miriam A., Watts, Richard J., 2005. Politeness theory and relational work. Journal of 
Politeness Research 1, 9–33.  
Locher, Miriam A., Watts, Richard J., 2008. Relational work and impoliteness: negotiating norms 
of linguistic behaviour. In: Bousfield, D., Locher, M.A. (Eds.), Impoliteness in Language: 
Studies on its Interplay with Power in Theory and Practice. Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin, pp. 
77–99.  
LPRG – Linguistic Politeness Research Group (Eds.), 2011. Discursive Approaches to Politeness. 
Walter de Gruyter, Berlin.  
Malloch, Stephen, Trevarthen, Colwyn (Eds.), 2009. Communicative Musicality. Exploring the 
Basis of Human Companionship. Oxford University Press, Oxford.  
Matoesian, Greg, 2005. Struck by speech revisited: embodied stance in jurisdictional discourse. 
Journal of Sociolinguistics 9 (2), 167–193.  
McKeon, Richard, 1941. The Basic Works of Aristotle. Random House, New York.  
Michel, Caroline, Caldara, Roberto, Rossion, Bruno, 2006. Same-race faces are perceived more 
holistically than other-race faces. Visual Cognition 14 (1), 55–73.  
Mondada, Lorenza, 2006. Video recording as the reflexive preservation and configuration of 
phenomenal features for analysis. In: Knoblauch, H., Raab, J., Soeffner, H.-G., Schnettler, B. 
 
 
 
Published in: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2013.05.014 
(Eds.), Video Analysis. Methodology and Methods. Qualitative Audiovisual Data Analysis in 
Sociology. Peter Lang, Bern, pp. 51–67.  
Morsbach, Helmut, Tyler, William J., 1986. A Japanese emotion: Amae. In: Harré, R. (Ed.), 1986. 
The Social Construction of the Emotions. Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 289–307.  
Niemeier, Susanne, Dirven, René (Eds.), 1997. The Language of Emotions: Conceptualization, 
Expressions, and the Theoretical Foundation. John Benjamins, Amsterdam.  
Nishdia, Tracy K., Lillard, Angeline S., 2007. The informative value of emotional expressions. 
Developmental Science 10 (2), 205–212.  
Norris, Sigrid, 2004. Analyzing Multimodal Interaction: A Methodological Framework. Routledge, 
New York.  
Ochs, Elinor, 1986. From feelings to grammar: a Samoan case study. In: Schieffelin, B., Ochs, E. 
(Eds.), Language Socialization Across Cultures. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 
251–272. 
Ochs, Elinor, Schieffelin, Bambi, 1984. Language acquisition and socialization: three 
developmental stories and their implications. In: Shweder, R., Le Vine, R.A. (Eds.), Culture 
Theory: Essays on Mind, Self, and Emotion. Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 276–
320. 
Ochs, Elinor, Schieffelin, Bambi, 1989. Language has a heart. Text 9 (1 (special issue: The 
Pragmatics of Affect)), 7–25. 
Oster, U., 2010. Using corpus methodology for semantic and pragmatic analyses: what can 
corpora tell us about the linguistic expression of emotions? Cognitive Linguistics 21 (4), 727–
763. 
Peirce, Charles S., 1977. Semiotics and Significs. Ed. by Charles Hardwick. Indiana University 
Press, Bloomington, IN. 
Pepin, Nicolas (Ed.), 2008. Studies on Emotions in Social Interactions. Special issue of the Bulletin 
Suisse de Linguistique Appliquée (VALS-ASLA) 88. Centre de linguistique appliquée, Université 
de Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel. Available from: 
http://doc.rero.ch/lm.php?url=1000,20,10,bulletin_vals_asla_2008_088 pdf. 
Planalp, Sally, 1998. Communicating emotion in everyday life: cues, channels, and processes. In: 
Andersen, P.A., Guerrero, L.K. (Eds.), Handbook of Communication and Emotion: Research, 
Theory, Applications, and Contexts. Academic Press, San Diego, pp. 29–48. 
Planalp, Sally, 1999. Communicating Emotion: Social, Moral, and Cultural Processes. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge. 
Planalp, Sally, Knie, Karen, 2002. Integrating verbal and nonverbal emotion(al) messages. In: 
Fussell, Susan R. (Ed.), The Verbal Communication of Emotions: Interdisciplinary Perspectives. 
Lawrence Erlbaum, Mahwah, New Jersey, pp. 55–77. 
Plutchik, Robert, 2003. Emotions and Life: Perspectives from Psychology, Biology, and Evolution. 
American Psychological Association, Washington. 
Reber, Elisabeth, 2012. Affectivity in Interaction. Sound Objects in English. John Benjamins, 
Amsterdam. 
Rozin, Paul, Royzman, Edward B., 2001. Negativity bias, negativity dominance, and contagion. 
Personality and Social Psychology Review 5 (4), 296–320. 
Ruhi, Sükriye, 2009. Evoking face in self and other-presentation in Turkish. In: Bargiela-Chiappini, 
Francesca, Haugh, Michael (Eds.), Face, Communication and Social Interaction. Equinox, 
London, pp. 155–174. 
107 
 
 
 
Published in: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2013.05.014 
Saraceni, Mario, 2003. The Language of Comics. Inter Text. Routledge, London. 
Schwarz-Friesel, Monika, 2007. Sprache und Emotion. Francke, Tübingen. 
Spencer-Oatey, Helen, 2007. Theories of identity and the analysis of face. Journal of Pragmatics 
39 (4), 639–656. 
Spencer-Oatey, Helen, 2011. Conceptualising ‘the relational’ in pragmatics: insights from 
metapragmatic emotion and (im)politeness comments. Journal of Pragmatics 43 (14), 3565–
3578. 
Spencer-Oatey, Helen, 2013. Relating at work: facets, dialectics and face. Journal of Pragmatics, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.pragma.2013.02.010. 
Tannen, Deborah, 1993. What’s in a frame? Surface evidence for underlying expectations. In: 
Tannen, D. (Ed.), Framing in Discourse. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 14–56. 
Tomasello, Michael, Carpenter, Malinda, Call, Josep, Behne, Tanya, Moll, Henrike, 2005. 
Understanding and sharing intentions: the origins of cultural cognition. Behavioral and Brain 
Sciences 28, 675–729. 
Tomkins, Silvan S., 1962. Affect, Imagery, and Consciousness, Vol. 1: The Positive Affects. 
Springer, New York. 
Tomkins, Silvan S., 1963. Affect, Imagery, and Consciousness, Vol. 2: The Negative Affects. 
Springer, New York. 
Tronick, Edward Z., 2005. Why is connection with others so critical? The formation of dyadic 
states of consciousness: coherence governed selection and the co-creation of meaning out of 
messy meaning making. In: Nadel, Jacqueline, Muir, Darwin (Eds.), Emotional Development. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 293–315. 
Turner, Jonathan H., 2000. On the Origins of Human Emotions. A Sociological Enquiry into the 
Evolution of Human Affect. Stanford University Press, Stanford. 
Turner, Jonathan H., 2007. Human Emotions: A Sociological Theory. Routledge, Oxford. 
Turner, Jonathan H., Stets, Jan E., 2005. The Sociology of Emotions. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
Watterson, Bill, 1990. The Authoritative Calvin and Hobbes. Warner Books, London. 
Wierzbicka, Anna, 1994. Emotion, language, and cultural scripts. In: Kitayama, S., Marcus, H.R. 
(Eds.), Emotion and Culture. American Psychological Association, Washington, DC, pp. 133–
196. 
Wilce, James E., 2009. Language and Emotion. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
